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INNOVATIVE REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL PARAMETERS FOR
ADVANCING CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES1
Zen Makuch,2 Slavina Georgieva,3 Behdeen Oraee-Mirzamani4

ABSTRACT
In the post-industrial age, the realisation of
inherent technical innovation potentials requires
that stakeholders develop flexible, cooperationbased frameworks if first mover opportunities and
advantages are to be realised. In the Paris
Agreement5 implementation context, carbon

1

This article forms part of our ongoing IC4S Carbon Capture and
Storage at Imperial College London research initiative. This article reflects our
experience in conducting research within the CCS stakeholder community the
results of which positively influenced the publication of analysis in a Summary
Note from the European Commission entitled “Guidance Document 4, Article
19 Financial Security and Article 20 Financial Contribution”. It also led to
revisions to the first publicly available draft of “Guidance Document 4, Article
19 Financial Security (“FS”) and Article 20 Financial Contribution” (“GD4”).
Accordingly, in line with this research, the Summary Note clarifies that it is
within the flexible discretion and, therefore, the legal jurisdiction of Member
States to determine the options for establishing the level of financial security to
be required of a CCS site operator (Article 19 of the CCS Directive) as well as
the need for additional post-monitoring cost coverage (Article 20 of the CCS
Directive). Further to these research-based interventions, the Summary Note
clarifies that the proxy 25% bottom line contingency suggested in the first draft
of GD4 should be overlooked in favour of a more site-specific risk analysis.
Accordingly, GD 4 was amended in this regard. Finally, the Summary Note
accepts the role that public government insurance may play in the absence of
commercial insurance particularly for “first mover” sites. In this regard, the
desire to reflect the cost of FS is noted in a new column for the Annex to GD 4
analysing the cost of FS Options. All of these changes by way of the Summary
Note and the revised final draft GD4 are, of course, welcomed as they make it
more likely that CCS will be taken up by EU Member States in accordance
with their Paris Agreement commitments.
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2015, Parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark agreement to combat climate
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capture and storage technologies have emerged as
a complementary adjunct to climate change
mitigation and a diversified energy mix. However,
developing the technology is not without technical
and financial risks. The challenge for key
stakeholders, primarily (but not exclusively)
government and industry counterparts is to develop
mutually reinforcing strategies, regulations and
policies for testing and commercialising Carbon
Capture and Storage (“CCS”) technologies and
networks, as that will be determinative of their fate.
In the Paris Agreement implementation
period, the UK, for example, has indicated a
commitment to bold greenhouse gas reductions
(57% by 2030), and investment in CCS, as part of
the ambitious emissions reductions targets set forth
by the European Union, the deployment of which is
meant to count for 20% of the greenhouse gas
emissions captured by 2030. This has subsequently
resulted in plans for several pilot CCS plants on UK
soil. The up-scaling of CCS to the demonstration
level, however, is dependent not only on the
presence of sufficient interest and funding – an
ongoing issue in the UK both pre- and post-Brexit but also on the existence of appropriate regulatory
conditions and options for additional private
financing by industrial stakeholders. Furthermore,
it is important to note that the up-scaling of projects
from pilot to demonstration, and further on to a
commercial-scale, is materializing in the context of
a global financial crisis and a dip in investment
trust in high-risk ventures.
The development of CCS projects in
individual states, is not only influenced by national
regulatory regimes, policy developments, and
fluctuations in financial markets, but is also
dependent upon the legislative signals given from
supra-national bodies and binding international
change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a
sustainable low carbon future. The Paris Agreement builds upon the
Convention and – for the first time – brings all nations into a common cause to
undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects,
with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it
charts a new course in the global climate effort.).
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agreements. In Europe, the CCS Directive’s
approach to long term environmental and related
financial risk has led to the current state of
regulatory and financial uncertainty, thereby,
giving rise to potentially uninsurable liabilities
which dis-incentivise private sector investment in
CCS technology. This is in contrast with legislation
in competing states including the United States,
Norway, Canada and Australia.
There is every indication that the paramount
issue standing in the way of CCS is uncertainty over
regulated financial security requirements for site
operators and the nature and attribution of liability
arising from leakage. This uncertainty could be
addressed by a combination of insurance for
storage sites and a robust permitting process, which
would minimize the likelihood of leakage to
virtually zero. There are, therefore, excellent
reasons for national and international law and
policymakers to seriously consider a more careful
and tailored legislative and policy mix, so that
regulatory oversight is in balance with innovative
financial, insurance and liability mechanisms. In
addition to exploring this subject matter, the article
offers a number of recommendations for flexible,
stakeholder partner-based advancement of CCS
technology potentials in climate change and related
environmental regulation.
Keywords: Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS
Risks, Long Term Liability, CCS Insurance, CCS
Directive.
INTRODUCTION6
The inherent capacity to innovate is no longer enough to
succeed in complex post-industrial societies. The resolution of
innovation-related economic and regulatory risk is also of
fundamental importance because we exist in a stakeholder milieu
in which neither regulators nor economic actors have effective,
6

The authors would like to thank Niall MacDowell, Paul Fennell,
Alex Walker, Tim Cockerill (University of Leeds), Rob Gross and other
colleagues in the Imperial College Centre for Energy Policy and Technology
(“ICCEPT”) and the Centre for Environmental Policy (“CEP”) for their
comments on this article and/or their academic support.
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unilateral technology implementation capabilities.7 As such,
implementing innovation now requires the flexible cooperation of
key stakeholders.
The UK is a European Union Member State known for its
commercial pragmatism and strong commitment to the mitigation
of climate change. This article informs Carbon Capture and Storage
(“CCS”) stakeholders and other readers about the legal and
financial context within which CCS technology currently stands. It
does so principally on a comparative basis by reference to several
jurisdictions around the world that are implementing CCS or have
experience with CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery from
reservoirs. Countries with a well-developed CCS regulatory
approach are given particular attention. Finally, the article offers
options that would allow for the construction of a best-fit regulatory
scenario which adequately addresses liability and risk issues for
CCS using the UK as a case study in view of its continuing interest
in this technology in a Paris Agreement context.
The Paris Agreement calls for countries to keep global
surface temperature increases to well below 2° Celsius. Since the
implementation period which commenced in 2016, comparatively
little has happened in respect of emissions reductions noting the
imperative nature of this potentially existential planetary challenge.
Rather than a reduction, the Carbon Tracker projects a temperature
rise to 3° – 3.4° even if current policies are implemented.8 An
important overlooked source of GHG emissions is industry, whose
projected share of emissions in a business-as-usual scenario may
well rise to 52% of overall emissions by 2050.9 Furthermore, to this
point, while electrification may provide a solution to our transport
and heating-based GHG emissions, this is not the case for industrial
7
See Bellona Found., Moving CCS forward in Europe:, ENGO
Network on CCS, BELLONA FOUND. 2 (May, 2013),
http://content.ccrasa.com/library_1/5083%20%20Moving%20CCS%20forward%20in%20Europe.pdf. (It is arguable that
the failure of the first round of the NER300 Programme - which would have
allowed the sale of emissions allowances under the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme in order to finance CCS demonstration projects – to yield even a single
CCS project serves as testimony to the failure of Member States to work with
industry in order to develop such projects.).
8
See Climate Analytics and New Climate Institute, 2100 Warming
Projections, CLIMATEACTIONTRACKER.ORG,
https://climateactiontracker.org/global/temperatures/ (last updated Sept. 23,
2020).
9
Jan-Justus Andreas et al., An Industry’s Guide to Climate Action,
BELLONA FOUNDATION (Nov. 26, 2018),
https://network.bellona.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2018/11/Industry-Reportfinal.pdf.
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“process emissions” (those related to raw material inputs not fossil
fuel burning). In Europe, de-carbonising cement, chemicals and
steel industries would require five times the renewable energy
currently being produced, seemingly an impossible task. This is
one key reason why negative emissions technologies [e.g., for the
purposes of this article, variously CCS, CC and Utilisation
(“CCU”) and CC Utilisation and Storage/Sequestration (“CCUS”)]
are fundamental to Paris Agreement compliance.
In a Paris Agreement implementation context, the
ambitious emissions reduction targets set forth by the European
Union, coupled with the commitment to Carbon Capture and
Storage (“CCS”) technology deployment, are meant to result in
15% of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions captured through this
technology by 2030 (with a subsequent steady rise from then
onwards).10 The UK has similarly indicated a commitment to bold
GHG reductions and investment in CCS which has resulted in plans
for several pilot carbon capture plants on UK soil.11 The up-scaling
of CCS beyond the demonstration level, however, is dependent not
only on the presence of sufficient interest and funding (from EUlevel and UK if not all governments with an interest in CCS), but
also on the existence of appropriate regulatory conditions and
options for additional private financing by industrial
stakeholders.12
Innovative financial and regulatory risk management
solutions and incentives become all the more important when we
recognise the commitments already being undertaken to design and
10

Council Directive 2009/31, On the Geological Storage of Carbon
Dioxide, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 (EC).
11
Dep’t of Energy and Climate Change, CCS Roadmap, GOV.UK
(May 2012),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/48317/4899-the-ccs-roadmap.pdf; see also Global Status of
CCS Report, Glob. CCS Inst.,
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/global-status-report/ (last visited
Mar. 12, 2020) (stating that there are now 51 large-scale CCS facilities
globally. These include 19 in operation, four under construction, and 28 in
various stages of development. Of all the facilities in operation, 17 are in the
industrial sector and 2 in power).
12
See Worley Parsons, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of
Carbon Capture and Storage –Report Three: Country Studies: The European
Union, GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE (Mar. 31, 2009),
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/archive/hub/publications/8517/strategicanalysis-global-status-ccs-country-study-european-union.pdf (It is noteworthy
that any given Member state has the legal right not to allow CCS sites within
its territory. If a sufficient number of Member States do not take up the
opportunity to implement CCS then the 2030 target may not be met ab initio.).

6

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

build CCS projects. As Figure 1 (below) demonstrates, there are
some 51 large scale CCS Facilities spanning 4 continents around
the world with focal points in North America, Europe China and
the Middle East. In total, 260 million tonnes of anthropogenic CO2
has been safely stored to date.13
Figure 1: Distribution of Large-Scale CCS Facilities (operation or
construction)14

Though this is somewhat encouraging, if we take a climate
policy progressive jurisdiction such as the EU as an example, then
we observe that total GHG emissions have only been reducing at
an average of 50 Mt CO2-eq. per year since 1990 (the 1992 UN
Climate Convention baseline year). In order to achieve its stated
goal of climate neutrality by 2050, annual emissions reductions
will need to increase to 130 Mt CO2-eq. The European
Commission’s strategic compliance scenarios foresee an important
role for CCS and CCU with 80-298 Mt of captured CO2 to be stored
underground and 201-307 Mt to be utilised in synthetic fuels and
materials respectively. For these projections to occur - noting that
Europe’s two large scale CCS facilities capture 1.55 Mtpa CO2 for
offshore storage – our storage and re-use capabilities must expand
by a factor of 181-391 by the target carbon neutral date of 2050.15
In order to achieve this, industry action and policy and
regulation are beginning to show signs of progress. Accordingly:

13

Global Status of CCS Report, supra note 11.
The Global CCS Institute lists these CCS facilities which include
capture, transport and storage of CO2 at a scale of 800,000 tonnes annually for
a coal-based power plant or at least 400,000 tonnes of CO2 annually for other
emissions-intensive industrial facilities (including natural gas-based power
generation). see Facilities Database, GLOB. CCS INST. (2019),
https://co2re.co/FacilityData.
15
In-depth analysis in support of the Commission Communication
COM (2018) 773, 2018 O.J. (C 773) 1.
14
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•

•
•
•
•

Norway is constructing a large-scale cement plant and a
waste to energy incinerator with both featuring carbon
capture capabilities that will result in additional shop and
pipeline infrastructure for storage several kilometres
offshore. This is part of a long-term plan to expand carbon
storage infrastructure in a transnational context.
Sweden’s cement and steel sectors will both implement
CCS capabilities and infrastructure in alignment with its
carbon neutral plan for 2045.
The UK is planning to implement six large scale CCS
projects in accordance with its 2030 Clean Growth Strategy
which will implement CCS at scale during this period.
The USA has increased tax incentives for carbon storage
(rather than release) from $10 to $50 t/CO2 as of 2018.
In the Netherlands, the port of Rotterdam will be the locus
of CO2 pipeline and storage infrastructure given its central
position for energy intensive industry. Accordingly, it plans
to manage storage of several million tonnes of CO2 per year
by 2030.16

Noting these major project installations and infrastructure and the
imperative to meet Paris Conventions GHG reduction targets, the
time is now to evolve regulatory and financial risk management
strategies and incentives for advancing nascent CCS and CCU
initiatives.
As it stands, CCS projects fall under the jurisdiction of
international law (the OSPAR17 and London Dumping18
Conventions). Interestingly, further to Article 6 of the 1996
Protocol to the London Dumping Convention, a 2009 amendment
to the Protocol exempts the export of CO2 for storage from the
prohibition on exports of wastes and other matter to other countries
for dumping or incineration at sea. However, only six of the
required minima of thirty-four nations have ratified the
amendment. It would be useful to explore how ratifying parties
might work together to permanently advance their CO2 storage
ambitions along the lines of the 2009 amendment. This should be
discussed with the contracting parties to the Convention so as not
to unnecessarily inhibit efforts to develop storage infrastructure at
16

Andreas, supra note 9.
Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67.
18
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S.
120 (entered into force Aug. 30, 1975).
17
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sea. Thankfully, a Resolution for Provisional Application of the
2009 CCS Export Amendment now allows countries to collaborate
in relation to the exportation and importation of CO2 for offshore
geological storage.19
In Europe, CCS projects are also regulated through
provisions of the EU CCS20, Emissions Trading (“ET”)21 and
Environmental Liability (“EL”)22 Directives. Furthermore, the upscaling of projects from pilot to demonstration, and then on to a
commercial-scale, is materializing in the context of continuing
global financial uncertainty, the COVID-19 pandemic and a dip in
investment trust in high-risk ventures. Still, the EU CCS
Directive’s approach to long term environmental and related
financial risk has led to the current state of regulatory and financial
uncertainty, thereby, giving rise to potentially uninsurable
liabilities which dis-incentivise private sector investment in CCS
technology.
As we shall see, competing jurisdictions outside the EU,
such as Norway, the USA, Canada and Australia have overcome
this issue through innovative and flexible funding mechanisms and
liability provisions. Even within the EU, the Member States of
Germany and the Netherlands have made adaptations to their
national laws which have allowed for the transposition of the EU
CCS Directive in a way that does not impede investment in, and
deployment of CCS demonstration projects in the near future.
The next section of this article analyses the legal
framework, which has emerged in European law, for the purpose of
addressing liability for CCS projects. This is followed by an
analysis of how the current policy scheme might affect the
competitiveness of EU CCS projects in regards to their international
counterparts and whether a risk-sharing regulatory approach is
appropriate for CCS technologies. Finally, we focus on the possible
scenarios - sets of regulatory and financing options - which may be
19

Tim Dixon, Positive Result on the London Protocol's CCS Export
Amendment, IEAGHG.ORG (Oct. 22, 2019), https://ieaghg.org/ccsresources/blog/positive-result-on-the-london-protocol-s-ccs-exportamendment.
20
Council Directive 2009/31, On the Geological Storage of Carbon
Dioxide, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 114 (EC).
21
Council Directive 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and Amending
Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC).
22
Council Directive 2004/35, On Environmental Liability with
Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J.
(L 143) 56, 75 (CE).
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advanced in order to coordinate CCS deployment in a manner that
complies with EU law and enables fair and robust competition with
projects in other jurisdictions. These options will also be of value
to any nation with an interest in CCS.
I.

THE CCS DIRECTIVE, RELATED DIRECTIVES AND
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 4 (“GD4”) 23

A. The CCS Directive
In this section we examine the legislative architecture (and
official guidance) around long term liability for CCS storage sites.
We find that there is a large number of risk management powers,
exclusively available to governmental Competent Authorities
(CAs) at the same time that there are substantial financial and
environmental liability risks placed on storage site operators. It is
submitted that this apparent imbalance justifies corrective national
legislative measures, for example by utilising a “cooperation” or
“partnership”-based approach to long term liability management,
as between site operators and regulators.
The CCS Directive provides a significant number of risk
management opportunities for UK regulators, while, at the same
time, placing significant costs on storage operators. For example,
regulators can choose not to approve storage sites with risky
geological profiles or to seek strict permit conditions so that human
error will be reduced, in respect of technical compliance.
Additionally, among the regulatory risk management opportunities
available to governments, is the right of authorities to require the
following:
•
•
•
•

That no storage site which may leak or create undue
environmental or health risks shall be permitted;
That no storage site shall be permitted without requisite
levels of financial security24 and technical excellence;
That a storage site shall not operate without a permit and
observance of all permit conditions;
That a storage site must feature effective monitoring and
reporting requirements to the regulatory authority;
23

Directorate-General for Climate Action, Implementation of
Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide-Guidance
Document Four, No. 070307/2009 of 15 June 2012, art. 19-20, 2009 O.J. (C 5)
1, 41.
24
Id. at 3 (“Financial Security”, as used in the CCS Directive,
defined).
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That the regulator must be notified immediately of leakages
or irregularities at the site;
That a storage site will be closed for breach of permit
conditions;
That the storage site operator will comply with strict
closure and aftercare requirements;
That all environmental and related financial liabilities may
be placed on the storage site operator;
That there shall be proportionate penalties for regulatory
infractions; and,
That emission allowances be purchased to cover leakage
events.

The sheer weight and nature of risk management opportunities,
available to the regulator, combined with the commensurate risk
management standards, procedures and financial and related
liability requirement placed upon the storage site operators,
suggests that a “cooperation” or “partnership” approach to risk
management and related long term and financial liability for
leakage is necessary. The following analysis illustrates the
significant consequences which storage site operators face in
maintaining compliance with the CCS Directive. It also comments
on the flexibility available to national authorities in devising long
term liability and related financial instruments for advancing CCS
within the UK’s legislative framework. This “flexibility” analysis
should reassure regulators that there are significant opportunities
available to regulators to incentivise CCS investment, and
subsequent technological and regulatory success, when
determining the long term liability and financial provisions that are
to be applied to storage site operators through the transposition of
the CCS Directive.
Analysis of the CCS Directive articles which address direct
liability for operators.
Article 17: Closure and Aftercare
“A storage site shall be closed:
a. if the relevant conditions stated in the permit are met;
b. at the substantiated request of the operator, after
authorisation of the competent authority;
c. if the competent authority so decides after the withdrawal
of a storage permit pursuant to Article 11(3).”
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In essence, once a site is deemed closed, liabilities pass to
the state (excluding monitoring and corrective measures). The time
limit before such passage could be long (decades), unless
appropriate needed legislative certainty is provided. A site can,
therefore, be shut if the operator or authority wants to close it, or if
its life has expired. There is a large liability placed on the operator,
if the site were to close earlier than expected, as set-up and
operational costs might not be fully covered. Nothing in this Article
prevents the sharing of risk between the operator and other parties
including the Competent Authority. The same observation applies
to the regulation of long-term liability and financial instruments.
Article 18: Transfer of Responsibility
Where a storage site has been closed pursuant to points (a)
or (b) of Article 17(1), all legal obligations relating to monitoring
and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements laid down in
this Directive, the surrender of allowances in the event of leakages
pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and preventive and remedial
action pursuant to Articles 5(1) and 6(1) of Directive2004/35/EC,
shall be transferred to the competent authority on its own initiative
or upon request from the operator.25
An operator needs approval to close the site, whilst rigs and
pumps are still installed. The Competent Authority can decide to
release the operator before 20 years is up, if they are satisfied the
gas is safe; this is an opportunity for the operator to obtain earlier
handover, particularly if the site geology is suitable. If the
geological conditions are suitable for earlier handover, this would
release the operator of liabilities, and reduce insurance or bond
costs. Therefore, bonds or insurance need to be negotiated on this
basis. This article does not prevent a more flexible approach to
addressing long term liability measures, nor does it preclude the
use of incentives, in addressing financial and practical burdens of
long-term site liability.
The transfer of responsibility, from the operator to the
Competent Authority, adds further risk reduction measures to the
arsenal of Competent Authority requirements. It should be noted,
however, that there is a need to define the handover timeline, with
a preferred specified handover period, as this would create
regulatory and insurance-related certainty. One such approach
would be for regulators to define a band of time from the storage
site closure date to 20-30 years afterwards when liability would
25

Id.
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then pass on to Competent Authorities. Furthermore, there could
be a chosen date within that time band which is deemed “an
average” date for achieving liability transfer. Of course, that date
would not be fixed and will depend on the specifics of each CCS
project. However, it would serve as a marker for both the CCS and
insurance industries.
Article 19: Financial Security (“FS”)
“Member States shall ensure proof that adequate financial
security is presented by the potential operator as part of the
application for a storage permit.” Use of cash, securities, bonds,
insurances or loan facilities can be used to give security. Operator
must show they can afford to run the site (including after closure
for at least 20 years minimum). Article does not preclude use of
incentives to assist operators in addressing long term liability costs.
Language offers great flexibility; an equivalent alternative to
financial security is permissible as part of the permit application.26
“Member States shall ensure that the operator makes a financial
contribution available to the competent authority before the
transfer of responsibility pursuant to Article 18 has taken place.”27
The monitoring period is 20 years. Costs to the authority
need to be itemised, so that the operator can allow for them at
tender. If CCS activities are successful, then the minimum financial
contribution in respect of monitoring is all that will have to be paid
in relation to the post-closure period. This article does not interfere
with a flexible approach to liability and financial instrument
regulation.
Article 28: Penalties
“Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties
applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted
pursuant to this Directive and take all measures necessary to ensure
that they are implemented.”28
26
See id. at 16, (Further to some of our original research presented to
the European Commission, an explicit paragraph was added to the Final GD4
(Section 2.1, page 1), seeking that at Member State level, a balance be struck
between regulatory oversight and pricing risk such that nations are not
“overpricing the risks in relation to these obligations for early movers”. In
much the same vein, new language was added to GD4 advising Member states
to adopt a “middle ground” when conducting a site-specific risk profile).
Article 20: Financial Contributions
27
Id.
28
Id.
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This standard penalty provision is not logically connected
to the design of risk management and liability mechanisms as
penalties are considered to apply solely to breach of Directive
provisions. Liability matters are addressed under the
Environmental Liability Directive. The operator must,
nevertheless, ensure that there is full compliance with CCS
Directive requirements, as penalties are likely to occur for permit
breaches and failure to submit monitoring report data. Noncompliance with these risk management-related measures can be
punished by the Competent Authority. This Article does not
contradict a more flexible approach to risk management and
liability sharing beyond the operator, provided that penalties are
proportional to liabilities.
Article 34 Amendment of Directive 2004/35/EC
“In Annex III to Directive (2004/35/EC) (The
Environmental Liability Directive), the following paragraph shall
be added: ’14. The operation of storage sites pursuant to Directive
2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the geological storage of CO2 (‘); Article 4.1 This
(Environmental Liability) Directive shall not cover environmental
damage or an imminent threat of such damage caused by ... b. a
natural phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible
character.”29
Operators have obligations in respect of the prevention and
remediation of environmental damage, associated with such sites.
Financial security measures are also to be undertaken by storage
site operators further to Article 14. A flexible interpretation of
Article 14 allows for use of ceilings on financial instruments as
well as exclusion of liability on behalf of operators, where they are
not at fault or are otherwise not negligent. It is also important to
note that a CCS operator will not be liable for environmental
damage or the imminent threat of damage in relation to a natural
phenomenon of exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.
From the preceding analysis, we can establish that, as a
minimum, CCS Directive Articles 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 28 and 34 all
provide Competent Authorities with liability management powers.
The following Articles (in Table 2) achieve the same with risk
management functions, thus adding to overall liability management
powers for Competent Authorities.
29

Id.
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In regards to risk management, the Directive articles which
address this issue are the following:
Article 4: Selection of Storage Sites
“Member States shall retain the right to determine the areas
from which storage sites may be selected pursuant to the
requirements of this Directive.”30 It is both possible and advisable
for Member States to consult with technical experts and other
stakeholders when determining site selection. A partnership
approach to the site-selection process could induce joint
involvement in shared liability.
Article 11: Changes. Review, Update and Withdrawal of Storage
Permits
1. The operator shall inform the competent authority of any
changes planned in the operation of the storage site,
including changes concerning the operator.31
2. Member States shall ensure that no substantial change is
implemented without a new or updated storage permit
issued in accordance with this Directive. Annex II, point 13,
first indent of Directive 85/337/EEC shall apply in such
cases.32
3. The competent authority shall review and where necessary
update or, as a last resort, withdraw the storage permit: (a)
if it has been notified or made aware of any leakages or
significant irregularities pursuant to Article 16(1); (b) if the
reports submitted pursuant to Article 14 or the
environmental inspections carried out pursuant to Article
15 show non-compliance with permit conditions or risks of
leakages or significant irregularities; (c) if it is aware of any
other failure by the operator to meet the permit conditions;
(d) if it appears necessary on the basis of the latest scientific
findings and technological progress; or (e) without
prejudice to points (a) to (d), five years after issuing the
permit and every 10 years thereafter.33
4. After a permit has been withdrawn pursuant to paragraph 3,
the competent authority shall either issue a new storage
permit or close the storage site pursuant to Article 17(1)(c).
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
31
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Until a new storage permit has been issued, the competent
authority shall temporarily take over all legal obligations
relating to acceptance criteria where the competent
authority decides to continue CO2 injections, monitoring
and corrective measures pursuant to the requirements laid
down in this Directive, the surrender of allowances in cases
of leakage pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC and
preventive and remedial action pursuant to Articles 5(1)
and 6(1) of Directive 2004/35/EC.34
In respect of commercial scale storage sites, it is worth
recalling that geological storage will extend over long periods of
time. Therefore, the CCS Directive spells out framework
requirements to ensure the long-term stewardship of storage sites.
The Directive, thus, provides for the possibility for sites to be
transferred to Member State control in the long term. However, that
can only occur once the Competent Authority has been assured that
no leakage is likely to occur (the operator retains responsibility for
a site whilst it presents a significant risk of leakage). Under the
CCS Directive, a storage site shall be transferred (legal liabilities
included) to the state when:
•
•
•
•

All available evidence indicates that the CO2 will be
completely contained for the indefinite future;
A minimum period before transfer to be determined by the
Competent Authority has elapsed;
A financial contribution for the post-transfer period
covering at least the costs for monitoring for 30 years has
been made and;
The site has been sealed and the injection facilities have
been removed. As this is the second key decision in the
lifecycle of a storage site (the first being the decision to
permit the site for use), a Commission review is foreseen at
this stage too.

There is a perception within EU regulatory circles (see CCS
Directive, Article 18) that potential storage site operator liabilities
and financial obligations end within approximately 20 years post
storage site closure (given as a minimum period). However, the
nature of Directive Article 18.1-2 language is such that the
conditions 1(a) “complete and permanent storage” may not be
proven by that time; (b) the 20-year period is a minimum; and 2(c)
site evolution “towards a situation of long-term stability” may not
be proven by that time. As such, this imprecise Directive language
34

Id.
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offers regulators an open door to deny the transfer of responsibility
from the storage site operator to the Competent Authority at the 20year threshold. In such circumstances, it has previously been
demonstrated, that regulators do not accept such a transfer of
responsibility in analogous environmental law fields (in Canada
and the United States) pertaining to waste management facilities
and contaminated land sites. Notably, transfers can be indefinitely
stalled by Competent Authorities through requests for more
monitoring data for example. This issue ought to be considered by
industry when discussing and agreeing permit conditions with
particularly risk averse governments.
B. Environmental Liability Directive
The CCS Directive itself does not address the specific
mechanics of liability. Hence, we must look to the Environmental
Liability Directive and the Emissions Trading Scheme Directive as
the CCS Directive delegates this matter to them.
Further to Article 34 of the CCS Directive, the
Environmental Liability Directive brings storage site operations
within the liability framework of the European Union. As such,
operators of CCS sites have obligations in respect of the prevention
and remediation of environmental damage associated with such
sites. This applies to all relevant “environmental damage” and
corresponding duties of prevention (Article 5) and
remediation/mitigation (Article 6) under the Environmental
Liability Directive. Financial security measures are also to be
undertaken by storage site operators further to Article 14 of the
Environmental Liability Directive. A flexible interpretation of
Article 14 allows for the use of ceilings on financial instruments. It
also allows for the exclusion of liability on behalf of operators,
where they are not at fault, are otherwise not negligent or a force
majeure exception is available.
C. Emissions Trading Directive
If we move on to the Emissions Trading Directive, by virtue
of the inclusion of geological storage sites under Annex I of the
Emissions Trading Directive, installations will be required to
surrender allowances for any emissions from the site (including
leakage) as calculated pursuant to the Monitoring and Reporting
Guidelines for CCS. The amount of the Financial Security (“FS”)
for this obligation can be based on the potential total tons of
emissions, including due to leakage(s), multiplied by the market
cost of purchasing an equivalent amount of allowances. This
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calculation will require (1) estimates for the total tons of emissions
that may be released, including due to leakage(s), (2) the timing of
emissions, and (3) costs of allowances when releases occur.
It is worth noting that Commission GD4, which is discussed
in more detail in the next section, has excised language from its
draft version, that specifically did not recommend the
determination of FS (for the surrender of allowances due to
leakages) by multiplying the estimated amount of funds by the
probability that the scenario occurs. Now, a “realistic and
appropriate middle ground scenario taking into account all
available evidence of the site-specific risk profile is used” as
recommended. In addition, GD4 contains a method for the
“calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a probability
distribution of the amount of leakage from the storage complex”
when ”there is a proposed use of probability distribution for
determining the size of a leak (not the probability that it will
occur)”. It also gives regulators the choice of selecting a risk
percentile for the size of the leakage to be used instead as an
estimate, instead of an inflexible 25% default contingency for FS.
Furthermore, there is specific mention of the fact that FS amounts
may now be updated “in case of leakage or significant
irregularities, or where the monitoring plan is updated pursuant to
Annex II of the CCS Directive”. Further to our original research,
which underlined the purpose of site-specific risk assessment, GD4
now emphasises that risk profiles differ by the type and upkeep of
a storage site and that financial contributions by operators ought to
reflect that. Taken as a whole, these amendments grant more
flexibility for the development and implementation of a risk
estimation curve that can be co-delivered by government and
industry cooperating on a site-specific basis.
GD4 observations aside, there is unavoidable uncertainty
about the future price of EU Allowances (“EUA”) at the time of
any potential leakage. There is no cap on the EUA price; the
penalty for excess emissions (100 Euros per tonne) does not relieve
the operator of the need to provide allowances to cover the
emissions and is not therefore a cap on EUA prices.
The need to hedge against such risk becomes important
when it is likely that liability for allowances would entail greater
costs over time, as carbon prices rise. Furthermore, the assumption
of long-term emissions credits liability would mean that
allowances which are bought in the future, as a compensatory
measure for loss of CO2 stored, would be with a significantly
higher price range than those bought today, which would only
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further defer investments. Therefore, as such, a liability of this kind
is not insurable and presents an incalculable risk to potential
storage site operators.
It is worth noting that, in terms of financial risk derived
from liability, the purchase of emissions credits serves as a climate
change mitigation and prevention strategy in itself. Arguably,
damage in terms of failed climate change mitigation is already
covered in respect of the types of damage listed in the EU
Environmental Liability Directive (2004/35/EC) (including, but
not limited to species loss, marine ecosystem damage, fundamental
changes in land use, damage to land, damage to water, etc.). These
types of damage occur as a result of anthropogenic climate change
as well, which is why CO2 as a pollutant has already been
determined to be remediated under climate change mitigation
measures. Accordingly, if capture operators are legally required to
buy emissions credits and storage operators are also bound to cover
liability for the same leakage event, there is an apparent doublepayment by the operator. This problem of double-counting liability
should be addressed by counterbalanced regulatory solutions that
push forward CCS technology investment.
D. Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the
Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, European
Commission Guidance Document 4
Further to the prompting behind our original research and
inputs to the European Commission Inter-Service and stakeholder
consultations around financial instruments and liability for CCS,
GD4 has met expectations that it would enhance flexibility for
regulators to design and implement innovative solutions to long
term liability and shows a greatly relaxed language, as to the
financial options available to Member States. There is much at
stake in this regard, as the absence of such solutions could likely
cause prospective firms that are interested in CCS storage to
withdraw said interest. As it stands, GD4 broadly encourages
Member States to secure the payment of the Financial Contribution
(“FC”) through the instruments and procedures described for FS. It
recommends options that are simple, established, and low risk.
Accordingly, complex financial arrangements are to be avoided as
falling outside the core competencies of Competent Authorities;
they are arrangements that appear to flout financial principles (e.g.,
more certainty and higher return) and may contain hidden risks.
The intent of FS and FC is to protect taxpayers and these
programmes are not intended to be used for financial speculation.
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GD4 pays particular attention to the flexibilities of
interpretation around Articles 19 and 20. With regard to Article
19, the following considerations are suggested in GD4:
•

•

•

•

FS should be periodically adjusted to take account of
changes to the assessed risk of leakage and the estimated
costs of the obligations to be addressed. This gives
flexibility to operators if they are able to establish low risk
(or declining risk).
FS instruments can include funds, financial institution
guarantees, insurance, and first party and related party
guarantees irrevocable trust funds, escrow, letter of credit,
or surety bonds. Operators may also offer EUAs as
equivalent to FS but their acceptance depends on the
Member State assessment that the EUAs provide sufficient
certainty, amount, liquidity and duration as well as the
assurance that the same EUAs are not held as FS for any
other purposes at the same time. The determination of FS
by multiplying the estimated amount of funds for a
corrective measures scenario, by the probability that the
scenario will occur, is not recommended (due to the fact
that if the likelihood of requiring certain corrective
measures is considered to be very low, such an expected
value calculation, will result in an amount of FS that will
be inadequate in the actual event of such FS being needed)
unless the calculation of the potential leakage amount is
based on a probability distribution.
Member State and national Competent Authorities may use
specific types of allowable FS mechanisms that might be
derived from existing laws and regulations about FS
instruments that are acceptable for closure and post-closure
care of waste landfills, for wastes from extractive
industries, decommissioning of offshore structures, transfrontier movements of hazardous wastes, environmental
liabilities under Directive 2004/35/EC (“ELD”) and other
relevant national programmes.
Determining an appropriate amount of FS for surrender of
allowances ought to be based upon a “realistic and
appropriate middle ground scenario taking account of all
available evidence of the site-specific risk profile” and a
“calculation of the potential leakage amount based on a
probability distribution of the amount of leakage from the
storage complex”.
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Article 20 shares the intent (of Article 19) that the posttransfer costs, of at least the monitoring obligation for a period of
30 years, need to be fully covered by the operator and that
necessary funds be readily available to the CA. However, GD4
gives further interpretation to some mechanisms which can be used
to finance this long-term liability:
•

•

•

•

•

It should not be assumed that the idea of a prepaid insurance
policy for financial assurance of geological sequestration
site closure and post closure monitoring would necessarily
also extend to an additional 30 years of monitoring after the
transfer of responsibility.
The CCS Directive does not require that the FC cover the
full estimated amount of the costs which the CA will incur
for the post-transfer obligations. However, there is no
restriction on setting the amount of the FC at a value that
might represent the full costs of those obligations.
With respect to determining the amount of FC, Member
State may allow the use of expected value techniques for
estimating FC amounts for contingent obligations in
addition to using more deterministic approaches to
estimating the FC for monitoring. In other words, when
calculating an amount for FC, the probability of each type
of contingent event may be factored into the cost estimates.
Member States with multiple storage sites can pool the risks
of contingent obligations to some degree. Where the
Member State intends for the operator’s FC to cover the
CA’s full costs, then the expected value approach should
not be used.
Elements related to the history of storing CO2 also may be
relevant in determining the post-transfer obligations of the
CA. In particular, the occurrence of leakages or significant
irregularities, detection of significant adverse effects and
assessment of the effectiveness of corrective measures
taken may affect estimates of the probability, duration,
scale and scope, intensity and timing of post-transfer
obligations.

In discussing CCS long-term liabilities, GD4 authors have
demonstrated the knowledge that a risk-sharing approach, such as
commercial insurance or risk pooling, would be preferable.
Specifically, they have acknowledged that obligations, which
appear least likely to arise, namely, corrective measures due to
leakages and surrender of allowances due to leakages, are also
those which would impose the largest cost burden (this being the
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case, particularly, for the surrender of allowances). Thus, they
recommend that, for a well-developed technology, with a large
number of relatively homogeneous sites and a long empirical
history, some kind of risk-sharing approach be established;
insurance is given as an example. They also do mention, however,
that the lack of experience with CCS and other factors creates a
high degree of uncertainty in estimating probabilities and
magnitudes of leakages. Interestingly, following our original
research, the revisions that appear in GD4, have resulted in a
‘softening’ of the language regarding the sufficiency of existing
data. As such, GD4 could be interpreted as being more open to the
contribution of expertise (regarding the estimation of high-risk
low-probability events such as leakages) from industrial
stakeholders.
By way of a counterbalance, GD4 does recognise that an
overly cautious approach would penalise the technology in its early
years, by requiring more security than the actual risk warrants.
GD4 authors recommend that Member States steer between these
extremes, in particular by evaluating risk during the site
characterisation phase. They perceive that the information, thus
gathered, may serve as a sufficient basis for a financial security
regime to be constructed specifically for CO2 leakages - a regime
which would take reasonable account of the limited risk of the more
extreme events, whilst not distorting the costs of CCS or exposing
the taxpayer.
Overall, the revised language in GD4 is more flexible
regarding the financing options available to Member States. The
revision now explicitly adopts that allowance be made for
public/Member State insurance. The opinions put forth by its
authors are encouraging, especially with regards to demonstration
phase projects, where certain allowances will be made. For
example, Member States are granted the opportunity to provide
public insurance, in the absence of commercial insurance, by
accepting transfer of risk in relation to surrender of allowances, in
exchange for a non-refundable premium. This is a useful option, as
it helps to resolve the inherent risk that attends otherwise
uninsurable activities and events. Should that insurance be
provided in conditions that are more favourable than those of the
market, this may come under State Aids obligations and the
Commission must be notified. The same requirement applies to
post-demonstration phase fully commercial sites.
It must be noted, however, that Member States are
cautioned that methods for meeting the FS must be found, even

22

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

when there are few CCS projects on the ground. Member States are
allowed to pool FS arrangements for first mover sites, in order to
increase the number of projects participating in the insurance
scheme and finance any liability in excess of the pool by
establishing a method for profit and loss sharing. This option is
sensible, provided that risk pooling is adjusted for individual site
characteristics – including both technical and financial risks. Care
would also need to be taken in ensuring that profit and loss sharing
calculations do not involve cross-subsidisation as between firms.
Other risk-sharing arrangements may be possible, as GD4
is not exhaustive on this point. Therefore, this ought to encourage
Member States to appropriate a flexible approach to leakage
liability, particularly in the deployment of demonstration projects.
This attitude may well encourage investment in CCS technology
rollout, as well as mandate data gathering for important statistical
measures, as to the exact risk parameters associated with long-term
storage of CO2. Once complete, this data will enable authorities to
draft permitting and regulatory measures, which are appropriate to
the full-scale commercial rollout of CCS.
Overall, a pragmatic view of European Commission CCS GD4
would be one where the required security and additional
contingency measures are assessed on a site-by-site basis. A
distinction ought to be made between liabilities in the
demonstration and commercialisation phases, as demonstration
projects will be facing first-of-a-kind issues. If a Member State has
issued a permit to the operator, it should assume that there is very
low risk of that site leaking (issues of past oil well, related access
to info, and other site characteristics will have been made public,
etc.). The operator and the Competent Authority ought to,
therefore, agree to a shared risk profile, perhaps through an
insurance mechanism, which would allow risk exposure to be
capped for the operator.
E. Review of the CCS Directive
The first European Commission Report on the review of
Directive 2009/31/EC on the geological storage of carbon dioxide,
does not provide a significant change to the state of the legislation
as is, but rather elucidates some of the thinking around CCS
development, indicating the preferred methods of market
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incentivisation, without disbarring any of the flexible options
discussed in this article.35
Overall, the report concludes that the Directive is “fit for
purpose and sets up the necessary regulatory framework to ensure
the safe capture, transport and storage of carbon dioxide while
allowing the Member States sufficient flexibility.”36 Furthermore,
it considers transposition measures to be complete, for all but one
Member State, and is advancing with conformity checks. The
safety provisions and legal certainty emanating from the CCS
Directive and GD4 are, therefore, seen as providing sufficient
signals to investors and any changes to the Directive, at this stage,
are discouraged, in order to not de-stabilize the efforts made so far.
However, despite the overall favourable review, there is an
acknowledgment by EU policymakers that the development of
CCS in Europe has been lacking, with a dearth of practical
knowledge impacting the ability to review available legislation in
a thorough manner. For example, there is a need to identify whether
and what existing transport and potential storage infrastructure is
suitable for reuse including by reference to existing natural gas
infrastructure and facilities and information sharing thereupon. It
would be of considerable utility for the EU and her Member States
to build these research components into existing research funding
programmes. A similar observation applies to other sub-surface
geological formations noting that the costs of acquisition,
exploration and related data acquisition can amount to €6 ($8) - €20
($25) per tonne of CO2.37 When this information is made available
then regulators should consider how to transfer or licence such
infrastructure for CO2 transport and storage purposes vis-a-vis
incumbent owners/rights holders while ensuring that said
regulators have the legal competence to regulate offshore facilities.
It is interesting to note that, in comparative terms, the United States
and Canada should also look to address the offshore regulation of
CCS as they have yet to do so.38 This is particularly the case for the
35

Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2014) 099 Final (Feb. 25, 2014).
36
Id.
37
ZEP, The Costs of CO2 Capture, Transport and Storage: Postdemonstration CCS in the EU, GLOB. CCS INST. (July 20, 2011),
https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/resources/publications-reportsresearch/the-costs-of-co2-capture-transport-and-storage-post-demonstrationccs-in-the-eu/.
38
See R. W. Webb & Gerrard, M.B., Overcoming Impediments to
Offshore CO2 Storage: Legal Issues in the United States and Canada, 49,
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United States as the Department of Energy’s Energy Technology
Laboratory announced $18 million for four offshore projects.
In a related development, last year’s first annual general
meeting of the Gulf of Mexico Offshore Projects reported the joint
aim “to develop partnerships which will work on storage
assessment, risk assessment and modelling, identifying monitoring
technologies for offshore, infrastructure re-purposing (pipelines,
platforms, and wells), regulatory considerations, and knowledge
dissemination and outreach”.39 As such, relevant offshore CCS
legislation will need to follow particularly once the demonstration
phase for these projects is complete. Rather encouragingly, in May
2019, United States Senator John Cornyn (Republican, Texas)
introduced Bill 1675 seeks to promote the research, development
and commercialisation of natural gas carbon capture technologies,
including through private sector partnerships on demonstration
projects.40 However, said legislation does not address CCS
operations beyond this phase. Further to these initiatives, the low
carbon price and the high cost of implementation for Member
States remain as significant barriers facing the desired whole-scale
deployment of CCS in 2030. Specific examples are made of
successful CCS projects outside of the EU, which often provide an
added economic benefit (through the use of Enhanced Oil
Recovery, a technique that is well-established in the USA).
The acknowledgement of these issues, however, is not seen
to require any further legislative intervention on an EU level. The
Commission sees Articles 19 and 20 as giving enough scope to
Member States, to decide how operators should prove their ability
to safely operate and monitor storage sites including up to the
transfer of responsibility to the Competent Authority. Furthermore,
as there is not enough practical experience, there is deemed to be a
lack of experience with Article 18 (i.e., post-closure transfers of
site liability to the competent authority), which will have to wait
until the next Commission review to be updated, if that is seen as
ENVTL. L. REP., 10634, 10634-10647, (2019) (According to the authors, these
jurisdictions regulate offshore CCS through a patchwork of laws rather than a
specifically designed offshore CCS framework. This will make the
advancement of offshore CCS in places such as the Cascadia Basin - a large
offshore basalt rock formation with considerable storage potential – a
challenging proposition.).
39
Tim Dixon, Gulf of Mexico Offshore Projects First Annual Meeting,
IEAGHG.ORG (Feb. 13, 2019), https://ieaghg.org/ccs-resources/blog/gulf-ofmexico-offshore-projects-first-annual-meeting.
40
Nick Snow, US Senate Bill Would Boost Carbon Capture
Research, 117, OIL & GAS J., 1, (2019).
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necessary. GD4 revision is also deferred to within 5 years’ time as
we await more practical knowledge.
In essence, the only new feedback from the 2014
Commission review report is to point to the reforms of the EU
carbon market and ETS Directive as the major expected drivers for
CCS and to demur on the issue of Emission Performance Standards
as an unnecessary adjunct to the ETS reform. The legislative
framework available (CCS Directive and GD4) will remain in
place, unchanged in the near future, and incentivisation of CCS
projects will either have to wait for the promised ETS reform, or to
take advantage of the flexibility inherent in the Directive and
Guidance documents in addressing the heretofore neglected longterm liability issues. If anything, we can see that while the
Commission is thinking of the low carbon price as a barrier, there
is, so far, a lack of acknowledgement that long-term liability and
risk provide equally strong, negative investment signals.
This is further evidenced in the summary opinions that the
European Commission has issued on two CCS permit applications.
Further to Article 10 [(1) - (2)] of the CCS Directive, the European
Commission is given the opportunity to issue non-binding opinions
on such draft storage permits. In the case of Block P18A of the
Dutch Continental Shelf, a proposal in which the scientific advice
indicates effectively no leakage, environmental or health risk, the
Commission sought additional legal assurances in respect of:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Notification of leakage risk (CCS Directive Articles 8 and
9);
A requirement that the wells in the adjacent P-15-9
reservoir must be CO2 secure as a condition of their closure
(CCS Directive Article 8);
Specific permit provisions on changes, review, updating
and withdrawal of the storage permit (CCS Directive
Articles 8 and 9);
Further information on the financial security for the project
which otherwise “appears to be at a very early stage” (CCS
Directive Articles 8 and 9);
Further professional development and technical training of
the operator and all staff (CCS Directive Article 8); and,
The processes, findings and outcome of the Environmental
Impact Assessment pursuant to Article 5 of the
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Directive

The European Commission reserved its rights to intervene
further in the storage application and permitting process as
development consent has not been granted at this stage. Similarly,
in the case of the UK draft permit for carbon dioxide storage in the
depleted Goldeneye gas condensate field on the UK Continental
Shelf, the European Commission warned the UK that it had not
provided sufficient information in its first draft permit submission
(upon which a second submission was subsequently satisfactorily
submitted and reviewed). The site features a negligible risk of
leakage, environmental or health risk. In its Opinion, the
Commission calls attention to a dispute over the post-closure
transfer of responsibility of the site with Shell (Petroleum) UK
indicating 6 years and the competent authority calling for 20 years
in accordance with the Directive. This dispute is also vital to a
determination as to whether the legal requirement for adequate
financial security has been satisfied. Unsurprisingly, as with the
Dutch permit application, the Commission opinion has withheld its
approval of the UK draft permit for carbon dioxide storage until
such time as an Environment Statement (in relation to an
Environmental Impact Assessment), which evaluates the effects of
substances other than CO2 that are present in CO2 streams, is
completed and approved. The same applies to agreement upon and
provision of evidence of financial security for the full 20-year post
closure monitoring period (CCS Articles 18 and 19).42
In summary, these two storage permit applications offer
further evidence of the need to address project proposal risk in the
context of CCS Directive barriers to the realisation of CCS as a
viable contributor to climate change mitigation in a much-needed
41

Relating to the Draft Permit for the Permanent Storage of Carbon
Dioxide in Block Section P18-4 of Block Section P18a of the Dutch
Continental Shelf, in Accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/31/EC of
23 April 2009 on the Geological storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2012)
1236 Final (Feb. 28, 2012).
42
On a Draft Permit for the Permanent Storage of Carbon Dioxide in
the Depleted Goldeneye Gas Condensate Field Located in Blocks 14/28b,
14/29a, 14/29e, 20/3b, 20/4b and 20/4c on the United Kingdom Continental
Shelf, in Accordance with Article 10(1) of Directive 2009/31/EC of 23 April
2009 on the Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2016) 152 Final
(Jan. 20, 2016).
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Paris Agreement implementation framework. Pursuant to the
second Report on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC
(The CCS Directive), we shall see whether the Commission is
similarly disposed to CCS as a means of implementing the Paris
Agreement when we obtain the Commission opinions on an
application for a storage permit that is being reviewed in Italy and
an application for the Q16 Maas field further to the Netherlands
ROAD project43. This is not known at the time of the third report
on the implementation of the Directive (October, 2019). On a more
optimistic note, according to the Commission “a considerable
number of Member States and Norway continue to support or plan
to support projects in the near future, through their national
programmes or funds, research and demonstration activities on
CCS”.44 As well, the Dutch CCS Porthos project has submitted two
further storage permit applications and sought an amendment to an
existing permit while Norway has awarded an exploration permit
for CO2 storage on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.45 Another
application for an exploration permit has been filed in Andalucía,
Spain.46 As further evidence of efforts to develop CCS activities
there are two main networks, the North Sea Basin Task Force and
the Baltic Sea Region CCS Network which together have eight
states cooperating in the development of transboundary solutions
for the transport and geological storage of CO2.47
F. EU State Aids / Competition Law
There may be those that point to State Aids/competition law
restrictions on regulatory solutions for financial instruments, for
long term liability regulation, further to the CCS Directive. It is
noted that, to date, the UK (pre and post-Brexit) and German
governments have taken a favourable position in this regard by
adopting a flexible approach to State Aids, and it would appear that
the European Commission is similarly disposed by reference to its

43
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2017) 37 Final, (Jan. 2, 2017).
44
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the Implementation of Directive 2009/31/EC on the Geological
Storage of Carbon Dioxide, COM (2019) 566 Final (Oct. 31, 2019).
45
Id.
46
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Id.
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Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020.48
There is also a strong argument to suggest that, in its essence,
carbon dioxide storage represents a public good or service, that
fulfils a government function of mitigating climate change. By
storing carbon, which would otherwise have been inevitably
produced in order to satisfy energy demand, storage serves to
mitigate climate change and to meet binding emissions reduction
targets, which are placed upon governments within an EU and
international legal context. Given the additional point that carbon
storage may well turn out to be a cost versus revenue neutral
activity, some easing of State Aids rules/competition law should
apply. This argumentation is supported by the EU Treaty obligation
of competition law to not obstruct the performance, in law or in
fact, of the particular tasks assigned to services of general
economic interest (i.e., arguably, the provision of carbon storage
for climate change prevention and mitigation is such a general
economic interest).49
Thus far, leading Member State governments have taken a
sensible approach to State Aid regulation and CCS. For this reason,
it is not suggested that a formal procedure be commenced to review
and amend the EU General Block Exemption Regulation or
Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020,
with the aim of codifying new principles and rules in respect of
CCS. This would constitute a drawn out and cumbersome process.
Given the history of CCS Directive negotiation, there would be
further uncertainty about the result and Member States and nonState interests, which are without direct and active interests and
projects in the field of CCS, would still be in a position to influence
the outcome in a manner, which may not best serve Member States
and private sector actors that wish to advance CCS technology.
There is also the observation that, the revision of EU state aids
regulation and guidance for CCS should have taken place at a time
that was commensurate with the creation of the CCS Directive.
In any event, the signs are that a flexible approach is being
taken by CCS implementing states, to the interpretation of State
Aids disciplines. As such, it is anticipated that regulators will
continue along these lines, as this approach has been further
48

Guidelines on environmental and energy state aid for 2014–2020,
2014 O.J. (C 200) 01. see also, Press Release, State Aid: Commission Approves
UK Support Scheme for Early Study Work on Carbon Capture and Storage
Demonstration Projects, 2013 O.J. (Mar. 20, 2013),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_13_254.
49
The issues raised in this sub-section require more detailed treatment
but are beyond the scope of this article.
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reinforced in the GD4 document. Specifically, the revisions that
appear in the document contain new language, which discusses the
possibility for Member States to provide some form of insurance
(in the absence of an insurance market for CCS) through a form of
risk-transfer. For example, this could appear as a surrender of
allowances in exchange for a non-refundable premium. Notably,
State Aids/competition law objections would only be invoked if the
said insurance is found to have been provided in commercial
conditions that are more favourable than those of the current
market. Furthermore, in another notable final revision in favour of
flexibility of policy/regulatory design, GD4 is not exhaustive as to
other types of risk-sharing arrangements, which could be
established, including individual risk-sharing arrangements with
CCS operators, on a case-by-case basis. The only stipulation
provided in the GD4 is that, “Where State aid within the meaning
of Article 107(1) of the TFEU (Treaty for European Union) is
involved in the establishment of the FS, in accordance with Article
108 of the TFEU, that State aid must be notified and authorised by
the Commission before it is granted.”50 This stipulation is merely a
statement of applicable EU law.
G. Summary
Noting the further regulatory and guidance requirements,
discussed in Section 2, and taking account of the financial,
environmental and human health liabilities surrounding ownership
of a storage facility under the CCS, ETS and Environmental
Liability Directives, it is submitted that a cooperative or
partnership-based approach to long term liabilities is required. This
point is further underscored when EU leaders have legislated in a
field for which there is no long-term liability insurance, thus
depriving industry of traditional Act of God insurance clauses that
apply in respect of naturally occurring events, which are beyond
the control of industrial operators. In the field of CCS, this is a
highly consequential omission and, thus, entails significant
additional risk for storage site operators because
earthquakes/tectonic plate shifts constitute the most significant
type of risk, in relation to long-term CO2 storage. In the absence of
a “cooperation” or “partner-based” approach, with the regulator,
these events are uninsurable and hence, all the financial and
liability-related risk is placed on the storage site operator.

50

Directorate-General for Climate Action, supra note 23.
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COMPETING JURISDICTIONS ARE STRETCHING FIRST
MOVER ADVANTAGE

A. First Mover Advantage through Regulation
Within the United States, regional and state-level initiatives
to address emissions from the power sector have been accompanied
by state and regional funding initiatives in innovation and
investment for carbon capture and storage. Federal initiatives alone
amount to $11 billion in investment in CCS projects, with a further
US-China Clean Energy Research Centre, aimed at joint CCS
technology development and implementation. In respect of the
most prominent such project funds (FutureGen), the states of
Illinois and Texas waived any storage site operator long-term
liabilities in respect of leakage for the (currently suspended)
FutureGen project sites. Further to this point, in order to ameliorate
permanent liability risk upon the private sector the states of Texas,
Montana and North Dakota permit the transfer of liability to them.
In this regard, it is noted that though federal regulation of CCS does
exist in the form of the Environmental Protection Agency’s final
permitting rule (for injection of CO2 for long term storage in Class
Vi wells)51 state-level regulation leads the way with more investorfriendly risk reduction mechanisms in the form of liability transfers
and fewer and shorter post-injection regulatory requirements. In
contrast, Federal Class VI well permitting leaves no room for
transfer of liability from the permit holder to the state and has 50year post-injection site care requirements. This is hardly an
endorsement for private sector research and development or related
investment in the CCS business. Hence, the area of liability
continues to receive significant attention in the United States.
Canada follows the same pattern with the federal government
maintaining relative regulatory silence while the sub-federal
provinces particularly Alberta develop investment and userfriendly approaches to CCS site permitting and liability
management along the lines of the State of North Dakota.
Still, according to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, carbon capture and storage is being seen as a
key enabling technology in relation to the US energy mix. As such,
CCS has been a focal point for significant research and
development funding. Electricity sector modelling suggests even
faster initial penetration of CCS at commercial scale with carbon
capture technology already being deployed at a coal-fired power
51
Criteria and Standards Applicable to Class III Wells, 40 C.F.R.
§146.31-4 (2020).
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plant at Boundary Dam, Saskatchewan.52 Further to this point, five
Class VI CCS storage permits have been issued, four for FutureGen
and one for the Archer Daniels Midland (Illinois) Industrial CCS
Project. Similarly, the COORETEC and Coal21 Programmes in
Germany and Australia reinforce this perspective. Such
jurisdictions tend to resonate with the IEA’s policy
recommendation to address limits to long-term project liability
(particularly in the demonstration phase) through project
indemnification by government and other industry supportive
measures.
In Canada, as part of efforts to make Canada a global leader
in carbon capture and storage, the government of Alberta alone has
dedicated $2 billion to CCS projects as a centrepiece of greenhouse
gas emissions mitigation through to 2050.53 Alberta's government
has estimated that CCS could contribute approximately 70% of the
province's CO2 mitigation efforts and intends to have several
projects operational this year. The Weyburn project has been
operating for more than a decade and provides an excellent
example of how projects can operate across borders and boundaries
(the Weyburn operations cover both sides of the US-Canadian
border).
In Alberta, the CCS Act amends the Mines and Minerals
Act, so that a closure certificate will be issued upon the completion
of a CCS Project. Thereafter, the government of Alberta will take
on liability for the captured CO2, assuming all obligations of the
party that injected it into the ground (the lessee) including:
•

•
•

•

Obligations as an owner and licensee under the Oil and Gas
Conservation Act of the wells and facilities covered by the
agreement that authorized the injection of the carbon
dioxide;
Obligations as the person responsible for the injected
captured carbon dioxide under the Environmental
Protection and Enhancement Act;
Obligations as the operator under Part 6 of the
Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act in respect
of the land within the location of the agreement used by the
lessee in relation to the injection of carbon dioxide; and
Obligations under the Surface Rights Act.

52

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency [EPA], EPA Analysis of the LiebermanWarner Climate Security Act of 2008 S. 2191 in 110th Congress, 2008.
53
Id.
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In Australia, as part of ongoing efforts to give industry assurances
and respective investment in CCS storage sites, a time limit is set
on litigation against CCS storage site operators (20 years following
project closure) and the federal government has assumed long-term
liability for leakage. These provisions are found in the Offshore
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act. These time limits
should prove to be of comfort to the commercial insurance
industry, as it seeks to extend CCS insurance products beyond
operational liability during the closure life of storage sites.
Naturally, given prevailing regulatory requirements, the need for
financial assurances and the potential length of storage, decommissioning and post-closure periods, the insurance industry
has yet to develop and offer products or services in this regard.
Zurich announced that it was making two CCS insurance products
Carbon Capture and Sequestration Liability Insurance and the
Geological Sequestration Financial Assurance available in 2009.54
However, Royal Dutch Shell’s Peterhead Project could not find an
underwriter owing to the lack of available underwriting
information (absence of claims history, limited number of CCS
projects for risk spreading and undefined liabilities).55
Finally, The Norwegian Sleipner project is an important
precedent, as we build the evidence base for CCS regulation around
the world. This is true for two reasons: thus far no significant
leakage issues have arisen, and the project has progressed as
expected in this regard; and, second, the Sleipner project itself
benefitted significantly from a carbon emission tax of €40 t/CO2.
As such, public sector participation in financing the project loomed
large in incentivising CCS in this jurisdiction. Interestingly, the
Sleipner Project is silent as to the liability of the Demonstration
Project Operator, in effect absolving the Project of any long-term
liability for leakage and transferring that responsibility to the
government.
B. First Mover Advantage through Demonstration Projects
Against the analytical backdrop of the CCS Directive, there
exists a legal argument that much of the planning, policy
development and implementation-related activities, as well as
contracting around Demonstration Phase projects, had already
taken place prior to the CCS Directive enforcement date of 25 July
54

Zurich, Advertisement on Carbon Capture and Storage Association,
CCSASSOCIATION.ORG, http://www.ccsassociation.org/about-us/ourmembers/zurich/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2020).
55
News desk, Shell Sees Large Risk Premiums for Carbon Capture
and Storage Cover, INSURANCETIMES (June 12, 2015).
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2011. As such, Demonstration Phase projects would not be subject
to the full legal requirements of the CCS Directive, at least with
respect to long-term liability, as those projects face first-of-a-kind
issues and risks. Furthermore, demonstration projects are necessary
as a means of informing government policy on CCS, advancing
first mover advantage, as well as better understanding the
particulars of permit design.
Equally, demonstration phase projects in Norway, Canada,
the United States and Australia have not had long term liabilities
placed on project operators, owing primarily to the first-of-a-kind
research and development-based nature of such work and the good
will that project operators have demonstrated, in sharing
knowledge designed to advance CCS as a climate change
mitigation option.
If Europe is to maintain pace with these competing
jurisdictions then, provided that moral hazard-related concerns can
be addressed contractually, demonstration phase projects ought to
be subject to a government indemnity, in respect of unintentional
environmental damage. For demonstration phase projects that have
advanced to the commercial storage stage it is appropriate to
develop permit conditions for sites along the lines of the
cooperative risk management and financial liability instruments
advocated in this Article.
C. Liability Case Studies in the Nuclear, Oil and Gas and
Waste Management Sectors
This section of the Article examines three mature
regulatory regimes that may inform the manner in which liability
should be managed in a CCS context. They are: the nuclear
industry; landfill site regulation and the management of oil spills at
sea. Aside from other self-evident conclusions, what appears from
examining these schemes are more sophisticated approaches to risk
management and financial liability sharing. By and large, capped
liability schemes are a pervasive feature, and greater investment
certainty is in place, even though the risk profiles of these sectors
are at least as high as those for CCS storage. The nuclear facility
example actually features a much higher overall risk profile. What
we also see for these activities is a significantly more receptive
response from the insurance sector, which is, arguably, one of the
lynchpins to the long-term success of the CCS sector.
With respect to the nuclear industry, the risk longevity for
radioactive waste is considerable. High-level radioactive waste is
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generally material from the core of the nuclear reactor or within
nuclear warheads. Most of the radioactive isotopes in high-level
waste emit large amounts of radiation and have extremely long
half-lives (some longer than 100,000 years) creating long time
periods before the waste will settle to safe levels of radioactivity.
Therefore, the potential risks can last for 100,000 years. The risks
of nuclear and CCS facilities are, in theory, similar in terms of the
possibility of leakage. However, the leakage of radioactive
materials would be more catastrophic. As well, serious risk
longevity for radioactive material has a greater duration than for
carbon dioxide. Even though the likelihood of leakage is similar
between the nuclear and CCS industries, depending upon scale and
experience, the impact and consequences will be far greater for a
radioactive leak with the liability period for CCS appearing to be
trivial by comparison.
In the UK, nuclear liabilities are covered by the Nuclear
Installations Act 1965 as amended by the Nuclear Installations
(Liability for Damage) Order 2016.56 Further to the 2016 revisions
of the Act, the limit on liability stands at €700 million for each
major installation. Therefore, the operator is liable for claims up to
this amount and must insure accordingly. Beyond any available
insurance coverage, the current Paris/Brussels system applies, with
the government contribution to meet any shortfall in insurance
coverage to meet the thresholds of €700 million (Paris claims) to
€1,500 million (Brussels claims). Such insurance is available in
large part because of these caps set on liability. The majority of
this insurance is provided by a pool of UK insurers comprising
eight insurance companies and sixteen Lloyds syndicates (Nuclear
Risk Insurers). This arrangement does not fall under state aids rules
as it is set under an International Convention.
In the United States of America, the Price-Anderson
Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (1957) establishes a no fault
insurance-type system in which the first $121.25 million per
reactor is payable by the operator when an accident occurs with a
maximum liability cap per reactor per incident of $450 million.57
Therefore, evidence of ability to pay is required as part of an
operator’s permit conditions. Noting that there are 104 such
reactors, £12.6 billion of the system is industry-funded through
private nuclear insurance pools. Any claims between $121.25
56

The Nuclear Installations (Liability for Damage) Order 2016, C.
562 (Eng.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/562/pdfs/uksi_20160562_en.pdf.
57
42 U.S. C. § 2210 (2006).
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million and $450 million would be covered by the federal
government. Thus far, a secondary insurance payout under this Act
has not been required. By corollary, if CCS Directive transposition
in the UK had resulted in a cap on liability, then the serious absence
of insurance (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell’s Peterhead Project) for CCS
storage site liability may well have been remedied. It would also
have, arguably, incentivised private sector participation in carbon
capture and storage.
In respect of waste management and liability, landfill sites
represent a potentially useful comparison with CCS storage sites,
on the basis that both facilities entail risk of leakage during the site
life and well beyond it. Both sites feature risks that arise beneath
the Earth’s surface (and as such are conventionally out of view)
and both risks may be large. In respect of liability, insurance cover
is needed for the long duration of the closure-related sealing and
inspection period for landfill (possibly 20-30 years). This is
expected to cover public and employee liability, from methane
leaks to injuries, and to indemnify the operator or the authority
from any continuing liability. The fact that such insurance exists is
a key reason why the private sector is involved in the landfill
business.58 Arguably, a state role in advancing public goods and
services such as waste management, environmental protection and,
by analogy, climate change mitigation is justified if not mandated
by law in the public interest.59
With respect to oil and gas spills at sea, they are comparable
to Carbon Capture and Storage’s financial and regulatory aspects
in the sense that, in both cases, an international pool fund may be
appropriate in case of incidents, such as leakage or structural failure
of seagoing vessels. Accordingly, funds could be drawn down to
cover the cost of damages. The consequences of the failure of both
cases (i.e. oil and gas spills and CCS) are broadly similar. When
such vessels fail or leak, oil and gas get released into water and the
atmosphere. The failure of CCS infrastructure has analogous
consequences. If there is a leak in deep geological formations, the
58

Interestingly, waste management sector public fund schemes exist
at country level in order to address post-closure costs. DuPage County Illinois
set up a $232 million public fund in order to cover potential post-closure costs
for nine landfills. see Concerned Citizens of Cattaraugus County, Inc.,
Municipal Liability for Pollution, CONCERNEDCITIZENS.HOMESTEAD (Apr. 1,
2008), http://concernedcitizens.homestead.com/municipal_liability.html.
59
Borden Ladner Gervais, Canada: The Non-Polluter Pays:
Municipal Liability For Cleaning Up Migrating Contamination, Mondaq (Dec.
11, 2012), https://www.mondaq.com/canada/Environment/210938/The-NonPolluter-Pays-Municipal-Liability-For-Cleaning-Up-MigratingContamination?
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captured CO2 is released into the atmosphere and in case there is a
leak in the ocean, the captured CO2 is released into the hydrosphere
with similar risks to the environment as those of oil and gas spills.
Further to the 1992 Convention on Liability and
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, an international fund for
compensation for pollution damage named “The International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund 1992” pays the costs and damages
resulting from an accident, of course, providing that the Fund
cannot prove that the accident was intentional or occurred as a
result of negligence and misconduct.
A tanker owner's liability limit, under the Civil Liability
Convention, depends on the size of the tanker. The liability limits
set out in the Civil Liability Convention, in respect of claims
following a spill of persistent oil, are as follows:
•
•
•

For all tankers with a gross tonnage up to 5,000: 4.51
million Special Drawing Rights (SDR)(approximately $7
million);
For tankers with a gross tonnage of between 5,000 and
140,000: 4.51 million SDR plus 631 SDR (approximately
$1,000) for each gross ton in excess of 5,000; and
For tankers with a gross tonnage of 140,000 and over: 89.77
million SDR (approximately $140 million).

As with the nuclear liability analogy, the existence of a cap on
liability, in addition to insurance, is not coincidental. Both elements
form the minimum basis for private sector participation in these
sectors. By analogy, CCS regulation should facilitate the existence
of these mechanisms if private sector participation is to be both
fruitful and competitive with other CCS jurisdictions.
III.

OPTIONS AND FORWARD-LOOKING SCENARIOS

D. CCS Regulation in the USA
Due to the relative uncertainty, over potentially isolated
significant leakage incidents, commercial insurers are currently
shying away from long term liability insurance provisions for CCS,
though they are committing to operational insurance (e.g. Zurich
Financial Services). Experience dictates that environmental
regulators look to insurers for the design of environmental liability
legislative provisions. Where long-term liabilities are uninsurable,
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then it is of critical importance to create other investment
incentives and create mechanisms, which effectively share the risk
(and potential liability) beyond the storage operator. Otherwise,
industry will be unwilling to internalise the risk and promising
initiatives may well fail. There is considerable discussion of USAstyle options when moving forward with CCS in Europe, in part
because Anglo-American policy and regulatory culture have some
similarities by comparison to other jurisdictions, and also because
the United States has been a historical leader in environmental
regulation.
Furthermore, the US has the longest history of carbon
dioxide injection into reservoirs for the purposes of Enhanced
Hydrocarbon Recovery (EHR) – a technology whose risk profile
closely resembles that of CCS. It is also one of the countries which
has best managed to take CCS from R&D into the market. It must
be noted that, while the existing US Federal framework currently
does not provide for a release or transfer of liability from the
operator to other persons, several state legislatures, including those
with actual experience of carbon dioxide injection through EHR,
have chosen to adopt legislation that provides for transfer of longterm liability to the respective State by various mechanisms. These
options include:
•
•
•

States agreeing to take on the long-term liability by
undertaking the CCS project themselves;
States assuming liability from CCS operators or;
States providing a mechanism for transfer of liability.

Furthermore, a number of States have begun to establish local
regimes for long-term liability transfer. Louisiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma and Texas have developed a “Certificate of
Completion” model, whereby the operator of a geologic
sequestration site can transfer title and liability to the State, after
demonstrating to the relevant agency that the site is stable for a
certain period of time, after the last CO2 has been injected, and that
the site has been closed. The states of Illinois and Texas have also
accepted liability for certain CCS pilot projects from the project
outset.
E. Regulatory and Financing Options
Broadly speaking, the US approach to CCS is characterized
by a reliance on the existing framework for long-term liability and
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stewardship, the adoption of substantive or procedural limitations
on claims and the creation of funds to support long-term
stewardship activities. The said approach also features
compensation of parties for various losses or damages incurred
after site closure, as well as in some cases the transfer of liability
to the federal government after site closure (with certain
contingencies). Figure 2 illustrates our professional judgment as to
some of the most relevant regulatory and financing options that
have been used by individual State legislatures, or have been
suggested as sound financing mechanisms from the risk averse US
Environmental Protection Agency, which has now taken over the
Federal regulation of CCS projects. Included are also the most
widely discussed options from the International Energy Agency, as
well as those scenarios suggested in the EU Commission Guidance
Documents and by our research team.
Figure 2: Our Graphic Representation of Regulatory and
Financial Options for Management of CCS Risk

Looking at our Figure 2, we can see that some financing or
regulatory options may be more suited to different levels of
maturity of CCS technology. When a project is still in its
demonstration phase, operators often face first-of-a-kind issues.
Thus, a flexible regulatory approach, which is still compliant with
the tenets of the EU CCS Directive, can allow for the development
of a regulatory framework for CCS in a manner that is integrated
with the process of technological evolution and competitive
leadership.
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A flexible approach from regulators, particularly at the
Demonstration phase, can include such measures as the adoption
of Substantive or Procedural Claims, government Liability or the
creation of a Project Based Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS).
Substantive or Procedural Claims would be advantageous in that
they would help to ease uncertainties from the business and
insurance communities over the extent of potential liabilities and
address uncertain or inconsistent government standards. The
adoption of ‘Liability by the government’ can take on many forms,
depending on the involvement at certain stages of CCS, i.e.
governmental ownership of CO2, ownership of pipelines or other
equipment, or even governmental oversight, financing, and
encouragement of CCS activities.
Structuring a regulatory programme in the demonstration
phase, so that the government is directly liable for CCS activities,
could reduce the complexity of assigning long-term liability for
those pilot phase projects. Additionally, for relevant States that
have not already done so [China and the European Union have
while Canada (federally), the USA (federally) and the Middle East
have yet to do so], the creation of a Project-Based ETS can be a
part of a trial sectoral approach to GHG mitigation, that would
allow for the testing of the way in which ETS credits are best
compensated, thereby overcoming the issue of Double-Counting
under the EU ETS and Environmental Liability Directives.
The rollout of different regulatory or financial measures,
alongside the maturation of CCS, is an approach that would not
only allow for the creation of best-fit techno-regulatory regimes,
but would also support the parallel testing of such policy/regulatory
options as CCS technology develops.
In the transitional phase between demonstration and fullscale deployment, the most appropriate regulatory measures are
arguably the gradual Liability Transfer to a federal government
level and the integration of CCS into a wider (EU or international)
Cap and Trade regime. With the transition of CCS into the
demonstration phase, the financial and environmental risks would
be much better established, allowing governments and private
insurers to better manage the associated potential liabilities.
Possible additional financial mechanisms, for regulation at such a
phase, include Discount Rate application, Escrow, Trust Funds and
Storage Bonds. These types of mechanisms are characterised by
the convergence of private fundraising options, under the oversight
of a governmentally appointed body. They would enable the
effective pooling of resources for leakage compensation and could

40

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

potentially be applied to CCS operators (in the event of liability not
being transferred to National Authorities). This would help pave
the way for the creation of a strong international regulatory
framework around CCS.
Once full-scale deployment is reached, regulatory measures
can be enacted via the Transfer of Liability Post Site-Closure to a
government body. This would, ideally, occur under the auspices of
an International Agreement on Long-term Liability, so as to allow
for the creation of best fit options between capture and storage
operators around the world, as well as to open up the use of CCS
credits under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Nationally, governments could enact Legislation Facilitating
Private Insurance Coverage or perhaps mandate a tax tied to a
super-fund, similar for that of oil spills. The level of revenue, raised
through such schemes, could thereby be set at an adequate level to
cover estimated liabilities. Depending on the levy amount, the cost
of CCS installation, and the credits given/taxes avoided by CCS
operators, would potentially be an incentivising and long-term
liability minimising mechanism for the drawing in of CCS
investors.
Alternatively, Extended Crediting Periods or Fees also
represent financial alternatives that would rely on monitoring
results and, thereby, act as a form of security buffer for CCS
operators, especially at capture sites.
F. Examples from other Jurisdictions
Some real-world examples, of flexible approaches to CCS
regulation, can be seen in the case of Norway, Australia, Canada
and the USA. Norway has incentivised CCS by legislating a carbon
emissions tax of €40 t/CO2. CCS is regulated both under the
Norwegian Pollution Act and the Petroleum Act. However, at the
present time responsibility for leakages is not satisfactorily
regulated under Norwegian law.
The long term liability associated with the storage of CO2
in Australia is for now covered under the Research Development
and Demonstration approval provision, under the Victorian
Environment Protection Act, which recognises that more
comprehensive legislative cover would be necessary in the future,
for any commercial geo-sequestration projects. Canadian
legislation, on the other hand, has taken the approach of issuing
closure certificates under a CCS Act with the government (of the
province in question) assuming responsibility for the stored CO2.
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Adopting a flexible regulatory approach, the US EPA, has
finalised requirements for CCS through the development of
permitting for a new class of storage wells (Class VI), to be used
specifically for geological storage of CO2. The EPA has proposed
a default 50-year timeframe for CCS liability with the provision
that the acting EPA Director may shorten or lengthen that period,
based on risk data gathered during the permitting process.
Additionally, this new permitting system will allow for financial
guarantees for CCS to be chosen from a variety of different options,
which would allow for greater market competition and rapid
deployment of lower-cost solutions in the CCS industry.
Within the EU, two legislatures stand out as having a
progressive view on CCS regulation while still adhering to the
letter of the CCS Directive: Germany and the Netherlands. The
government of the Netherlands implemented the CCS Directive by
amending the Netherlands Mining Act, which requires that CCS
would operate under a Permitting regime (similar to that of the US).
Preliminary analysis indicates that liability will lie with the storage
license holder, up to the point of the license expiration. If at that
point there is a legal successor, or the materials are proven to be
definitively left in the subsoil, the liability would be removed from
the license holder. Furthermore, it is likely that the Dutch
government will set up a fund to deal with unexpected damages at
storage sites, perhaps similar to the one for oil spills.60
In 2009, the German government mooted a draft Carbon
Capture Storage Act on CCS, which allows it to conduct extensive
testing of the technology, on the basis of which further requisite
implementing legislation will be drafted. Importantly, the draft Act
includes the possibility that, after a period of 30 years from the
decommissioning of a plant, and thus about 80 years after its startup, operators may transfer their responsibility to the Federal
government (once the operator has established proof of the longterm safety of the storage site).61 The draft Act has not become into
force. However, with the re-emergence of support for CCS by the
German government as of 2019 we are likely to see CCS legislation
again soon. On another note, the CCS Demonstration Project
60

Bellona Foundation, New Dutch government puts CO2 capture and
storage at forefront in climate plan, BELLONA.ORG (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://bellona.org/news/ccs/2017-10-24057. (How that relates to potential
damages remains to be seen).
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H. Weyer, Legal framework for CCS in the EU and Germany, in
Clean Energy Systems in the Subsurface: Production, Storage and Conversion
21-8, (Michael Z. Hou et. al. eds., (2013).
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Network, which is sponsored by the European Commission, has
also expressed the belief that long-term CCS liability will be dealt
with in the manner of oil spills – with “the state assuming liability
after a regulated abandonment process”.
G. Summary and Recommendations
When considering regulatory and financial scenarios for the
management of CCS liability, we have discussed a public/private
liability fund (which, in essence provides an insurance function in
the absence of commercial insurance) as an over-arching
mechanism, standing at the interface of government oversight and
private finance, and which has the potential to be adapted and
expanded alongside the maturation and upscaling of CCS
technology. Such a fund could set a threshold of liability for storage
site operators, beyond which public liability insurance or
indemnification would apply. A CCS fund can be adapted to grow
alongside the rate of creation of CCS projects. Additionally, if risk
is factored in, it would allow for a fair contribution by each operator
and would be a more proportionate method of accounting for the
probability of a leak (noting that fund contributions would be
individually earmarked to indemnification events that are specific
to each fund contributor – such that cross subsidisation of other
firms is not possible). Even though it might not be an immediately
appealing option to operators, due to concerns about crosssubsidisation of competitors,62 the creation of a liability fund of this
nature has the potential to be a vital cornerstone for the
establishment of a private insurance market for CCS.
Public/Private Liability Funds can bolster confidence with regard
to the risk profiles of CCS activities and spark the interest of private
insurance firms.
Regardless of the position on the establishment of
Public/Private liability funds, a government/public indemnification
scheme ought to be set up during the demonstration phase of CCS
technology rollouts, in order to ensure that there is investment from
private sector stakeholders. On the basis of the analysis undertaken
thus far, this Article supports the use of a government liability (also
known as Indemnification) framework for demonstration projects
along the lines of competing CCS jurisdictions. In order to address
“moral hazard” arguments, exceptions to governmental liability
62

By this we mean that cross subsidisation should be prohibited such
that any payments made by one storage site operator should not be used to
indemnify adversely affected parties or environmental damage caused through
a leak that is the responsibility of another storage site operator.
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could be established around concepts of operator fault or
negligence (see the Environmental Liability Directive) and a duty
to apply best available techniques in the demonstration phase along
the lines of the Industrial Emissions Directive.63
Furthermore, demonstration project operators can assure
Competent Authorities of their financial stability though Trust
Funds, Escrows or Storage Bonds and, thereby, demonstrate their
ability to handle operational risk within the required time frame. In
cases of operator default, a payment of surety bonds can contribute
to a standby trust fund in the amount equal to the face value of the
bond and sufficient to cover estimated costs; a performance surety
bond guarantees performance of the specific activity or payment of
an amount equivalent to the estimated costs into a standby trust
fund.
It must be noted that while a range of possible options has
been accepted by the authors as workable, there are certain
overriding features that should be applied from the date upon which
a long-term liability framework is set up for CCS. The first aim
should be to create the market conditions in which private
insurance products can be offered in the CCS market. This
proposition is advanced on the basis that private sector insurers are
the world’s leading experts in risk management pertaining to
environmental technology and will provide the best means for
allocating financial risk with the interests of civil society in mind.
Further to these observations, long term liability for CCS
storage should be extended to a maximum approximating
£50,000,000, having regard to other types of damage and
remediation costs in the field of environmental protection law.
Claims over £50,000,000 should be absorbed by a public insurance
mechanism or other public guaranty. Equally, greater regulatory
certainty should be established by specifying a maximum period of
time (somewhere between 20 and 30 years is reasonable and can
be accommodated without the amendment of the CCS Directive)
after which there should be a transfer of responsibility for a closed
storage site to competent authorities.
These two measures should be sufficient to create a private
sector insurance market for CCS. To incentivise cutting edge CCS
technology development and to provide for the best storage sites,
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the £50,000,000 threshold should be subject to adjustment
depending upon three criteria, namely: storage site characteristics,
technical competence of the operator and the financial capacity of
the operator to address CCS risk. The threshold amount for each
site should be subject to review every five years.
Finally, exemption from the purchase of ETS Directive (or
similar State schemes) allowances in proportion to the amount of
greenhouse gases stored, is completely justified by the aims of
climate change mitigation and surrounding international, EU or
other applicable national laws. However, in a European-style or
analogous context, the duty to purchase allowances in relation to
leakage serves little in terms of policy purpose. This is because the
duty of remediation and supporting penalties in respect of the
Environmental Liability Directive and the CCS Directive provide
Competent Authorities with ample means of punishing and
remediating leak-based damage including climate-related damage.
This point is made in the knowledge that CO2 stream providers to
CCS storage sites will be legally required to capture CO2 in the
future.
CONCLUSION
Ambitious emissions reduction targets for the near future
driven by the Paris Agreement and the suitability of Carbon
Capture technology for that purpose, have combined to propel CCS
development on a global level as a contributing response to climate
change. As carbon capture is “low-hanging fruit” and involves
technological and scientific knowledge already available to a wide
range of actors in the energy industry, it allows for a relatively lowcost method (compared to the true cost of nuclear or offshore wind
power) for industrial stakeholders to contribute to climate change
mitigation targets, set forth by governments.
As it stands, CCS legislation is comprised of an overlapping
network of international agreements and regional (in the case of the
EU) policies. In unison, they form a strong basis for environmental
protection from leakage of carbon storage sites, through the use of
the precautionary and polluter pays principles. However, these
legislative instruments form an uncoordinated legal basis for CCS,
with overly stringent financial and liability provisions. At present,
this poses a significant barrier to stakeholder investment,
technology development and roll-out.
Carbon Capture and Storage will have to unfold in a
competitive energy sector and holds within it ramifications for
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energy security. Unfortunately, the current overly guarded
regulation frameworks that we find, particularly at the EU level,
are restrictive to CCS evolution and competition. Therefore,
governments are advised to work with industry in providing clear
regulatory solutions for a predictable investment framework for
CCS. This would allow for the tailoring of legislation and policy,
having in mind the international legal basis for CCS, to the specific
investment and regulatory climate of a given country. Furthermore,
it would take advantage of pre-existing good relationships between
policymakers and industry, which can lead to invaluable feedback
on the appropriateness and ramifications of regulatory decisions.
Ultimately, it is suggested that this would enhance the precision of
monitoring activities and allow for a more inclusive approach to
risk management measures.
A flexible approach to CCS liability provisions is not
necessarily unique or unprecedented. In fact, selective flexibility is
being adopted across a range of CCS stakeholders acting in
national contexts. Norway, the USA, Canada and Australia have
shown an innovative approach to handling liabilities and often
make clear distinctions between demonstration and commercial
phases of the technology, in terms of the burden of payment for the
operator. The European Union itself is moving towards a more
amenable interpretation of the CCS Directive as evidenced by the
positions put forward in successive Commission Guidance
Documents. Furthermore, there is every indication that the
paramount issue standing in the way of CCS - the uncertainty over
the nature and attribution of liability arising from leakage - could
be addressed by a combination of some form of insurance
framework for storage sites and a robust permitting process
(formulated from governmental best practice policies), which
would minimize the likelihood of leakage to virtually zero.
Therefore, there are excellent reasons for law and policymakers to
seriously consider a more flexible, innovative approach to CCS
legislation and policies, by taking into account the issue of longterm liability and other significant legislative barriers to the
necessary dissemination of CCS technology in the near future.
After all, negative emissions technologies are a necessary
component of successful Paris Agreement compliance and our
elusive quest to stabilise the world’s greenhouse gas emissions.

